Antecedentes: El uso de la tecnología médica amplía las posibilidades de vida, pero plantea responsabilidades y problemas filosóficos, legales o políticos. Objetivo: Realizar una revisión sistemática sobre la evolución de las publicaciones científicas del uso bioético de las tecnologías de salud en los últimos 20 años. Metodología: Se realizó una revisión bibliográfica usando la base de datos Scopus. Resultados: La aplicabilidad de las tecnologías de salud, desde un punto de vista bioético, ha aumentado en los últimos años. Conclusión. Existe un (...) aumento en el número de publicaciones del uso bioético de la tecnología médica en los últimos 20 años. (shrink)

The description of the organization and production of knowledge in occidental culture makes evident the existence of a unilineal orientation in the effort to comprehend reality and its dynamics. In a givenmoment of the process, it could be found to be in the Renaissance period, emphasizing the empi..

This article evaluated the effects of an interpersonal skills program based on artistic expressions to reduce intimate partner violence in college students. The research was of explanatory type, quasi-experimental design and used the Dating Abuse questionnaire (adapted by Osorio, 2014), the Interpersonal Skills questionnaire with reliability of 0.81 having as results in the entry test in terms of violence a mean of 88. 16 and after the program was applied it decreased to 81.2, in interpersonal skills the mean of 46.6 (...) increased to 53.3 with large effect size according to Cohen's d 7.889 CI95% (6.246-9.532), statistically significant differences were found in terms of violence. (shrink)

Grounded theory, a research method born out of the social sciences field, offers a flexible technique that allows simultaneous data collection and processing. Researchers using this method immerse themselves in an area of study, focusing their observations on the data and taking into consideration not only their own interpretations, but also those of the other subjects involved, in order to strengthen their understanding of the social phenomena under examination. This text briefly describes the concept of grounded theory and uses concrete (...) examples to illustrate how data are analysed from the standpoint of the stereotype as an object of study. La teoría fundamentada, nacida al interior de las ciencias sociales, es un método de investigación que posee una técnica flexible y que realiza simultáneamente la recolección y el procesamiento de los datos. En este método, el investigador se encuentra inmerso en el campo de estudio y sus observaciones se abocan al dato, considerando tanto su interpretación como la de los otros sujetos implicados, con la finalidad de fortalecer la comprensión del fenómeno social investigado. En este texto se describe brevemente la teoría fundamentada y cómo se analizan los datos mediante ejemplos concretos, que se presentan a partir del estereotipo como objeto de estudio. (shrink)

RESUMEN Aunque la educación superior cubana constituye un espacio privilegiado para la atención a la diversidad cultural, se identifica la carencia de una concepción de la interculturalidad desde el sujeto que vive la experiencia y cuya cultura de origen se instaura como dimensión mediatizadora de la relación con respecto a otros; carencia no abordada en profundidad a través del prisma de la sicología social. En este orden se realizó una revisión bibliográfica con el objetivo de profundizar en el enfoque sicosocial (...) expresivo de las relaciones interculturales contextualizadas en la enseñanza médica superior cubana; la misma, contribuyó a la comprensión de la expresión subjetiva conformada alrededor de la realidad objeto de estudio. Los resultados permitieron construir un cuerpo teórico descriptivo-explicativo de las emergencias subjetivas que adquieren su especificidad en las relaciones interculturales desde un compromiso práctico y axiológico. A modo de conclusiones se estableció que en la búsqueda de un campo académico unificado y coherente con la complejidad de la realidad objeto de estudio, la sicología social deviene tributaria de un enfoque centrado en el estudio de las formas de subjetividad social que median en las relaciones interculturales desde el contexto de la enseñanza médica superior cubana. ABSTRACT Even though Cuban higher education is a privileged space for the attention of cultural diversity, the lack of an intercultural conception from the person who lives the experience and whose home culture is established as an interfering dimension in his relationship with others is identified; a problem which is not dealt with in depth through the perspective of social psychology. Therefore, a bibliographic review was made in order to go into depth in the expressive psychosocial approach to intercultural relationships put in context in Cuban higher medical education. It contributed to the understanding of the subjective expression which makes the reality of the object of study. The results allowed to make a descriptive-explanatory theoretical body of the subjective emergencies which become specific in intercultural relationships from a practical and axiological commitment. As a conclusion, it was established the search of an academic field which can be unifying and coherent with the complexity of the reality object of study. Social psychology becomes tributary of an approach that is centered in the study of social subjectivity forms that mediate in intercultural relationships from the context of Cuban higher medical education. (shrink)

En este contexto interesa preguntarse por la significación y la utilidad que puede tener hoy una conversación con los escritos de Wittgenstein. No es una pregunta que deba interesar sólo a los especialistas, sean filósofos profesionales o de otros campos científicos, sino que es una pregunta que toca los intereses de las personas en cualquiera de los ámbitos de la acción. En el contexto del giro hermenéutico en el pensamiento de Wittgenstein me propongo destacar algunos puntos que pueden dar (...) lugar a un diálogo más amplio entre el pensamiento de Wittgenstein y la hermenéutica filosófica contemporánea, tales como la relación entre los conceptos de ethos o forma de vida, logos, juego, sentido común y cotidianidad. (shrink)

En Guadalajara, Jalisco, México, surgió la propuesta por parte del gobierno municipal de decorar las calles con el proyecto “Gigantes urbanos”; una de las estatuas que lo conforman se llama La pluma, del artista Pedro Escapa. El presente trabajo tomará esta obra como excusa para reflexionar el papel del escritor y del periodista que podría tener la sociedad actual siguiendo la idea de “posmodernidad” que sugirió Lyotard en 1986. Aunado a esto, se retomarán declaraciones y entrevistas dadas por expertos del (...) arte posmoderno para determinar esta imago que se tiene de los reporteros e intelectuales en Guadalajara y descubrir que del escritor sólo nos queda una imagen borrosa, un mártir o alguien que merece esculturas monumentales de varios millones de pesos: una reflexión útil desde el campo de las Humanidades para los habitantes de esta ciudad. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Political thought, from Aristotle to Lefebvre, has placed importance on the control of space as an activity of political power. Extraordinary measures taken by global policy-makers since the early 2020s as part of efforts to to combat the pandemic have included mass lock-downs, closed borders, social distancing and other forms of spatial control. Importantly, spaces dedicated to religious worship (churches, etc.) were subjected to extraordinary regulation. In the exercise of this new control of space, social control has played an important (...) role (obligation to declare one’s health condition, incitement to denounce offenders...) fostered by the authorities through various means of new social education, generating new social habits in terms of the management of space. Religious freedom and the autonomy of the Church thus faced new challenges as a result of the extraordinary control of religious space by civil power and the pressure of social control. The new forms of control incorporated into our habits deserve to be critically reviewed in our search for true spaces of freedom that are not sacrificed in the name of supposed science. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can only result from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behavior, but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’s fading qualia argument falls in it. (shrink)

This article states that research in skill acquisitionand executionhas underestimated the relevance of some features of attention. We present and theoretically discuss two essential features of attention that have been systematically overlooked in the research of skill acquisitionandexecution. First, attention alters the appearance of the perceived stimuli in an essential way; and second, attention plays a fundamental role in action, being crucial for solving the so called ’many-many problem’, that is to say, the problem of generating a coherent behavior byselecting (...) between many inputs and many potential outputs. We discuss the importance of these features for skill acquisition in sport. We also suggest empirical ways to assess the precise impact of taking them into consideration and at the same time we propose important implications for training derived from the ideas discussed in the paper. (shrink)

Many philosophers and scientists have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order Representationalist theories, attempt to explain such a self-awareness by means of a higher-order representation. Consciousness relies on our capacity to represent our own mental states, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. In this paper I will argue (...) that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories. (shrink)

The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non-transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

In this article we aim to support the thesis that Nietzsche, from his first work The Birth of Tragedy, to his last texts, such as Twilight of the Idols, in What I owe to the ancients, proposes a radical transvaluation of the meaning of suffering human. He adopts a completely different perspective from Western metaphysical and religious conceptions, which considered suffering as an objection to life, arising from faults, failures, “sins”, which must be expiated through countless constraints, until inexorable death. (...) The nietzschean transvaluation, with its unique tragic perspective, inaugurated in The Birth of Tragedy and sustained throughout his entire work, far from considering suffering as an objection or imperfection of existence, values it and even exalts it as another modality of becoming. vital, consubstantial and inherent in every affirmation, every pleasure, every possibility of joy. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to analyze the consequences that affect the First Metaphysical Principles when the Ontological Argument is established. Saint Anselm and Descartes do not share the same consideration about the first principles. My intention is to show the differences between their points of view and at the same time contrast these ideas with Polo's theory.

Resumo: Abordamos a interpretação nietzschiana sobre “liberdade” e “necessidade” e como o filósofo contesta noções da tradição, vinculadas a essa problemática: “causa e efeito”, “sujeito”, “vontade”, etc. Ele assinala como esses conceitos seriam construtos antropomórficos que não conseguem desvendar as ações geridas apenas pela dinâmica da vontade de potência. Mostramos que Nietzsche, mesmo com sua crítica aos conceitos da tradição, continua empregando noções como “fatalidade”, “necessidade”, que parecem reeditar uma conceituação antropomórfica. Indicamos como ele ultrapassa objeções passíveis de serem feitas (...) a um pensamento oscilante, que parece negar e afirmar a liberdade. Concordamos com intérpretes que destacam como seu estilo suscita deliberadamente paradoxos e aporias, já que seu objetivo, antes que estabelecer uma doutrina ou uma teoria consolidada, visa instigar novas reflexões e experiências de pensamento sobre o agir do homem.: We address nietzschiana interpretation on the issue of freedom and necessity. We show how the German philosopher disputes notions of philosophical tradition, linked to this problem, as “cause and effect”, “subject”, “i”, “will” etc. He points how these concepts would be just anthropomorphic constructs that cannot unravel the nature of the actions; managed only by the power control game of the will of power. We show that Nietzsche, even with this radical criticism of the concepts of tradition, continues to employ notions such as “fatality”, “necessity” that seem to resend to the anthropomorphic conceptualization questioned. We indicate how the author of Zaratustra manages to overcome the objections that may be made to an oscillating thought, which sometimes seems to deny and affirm freedom at different times of his work. We agree with interpreters who point out that Nietzsche’s style deliberately chooses to raise paradoxes and apparent apores, since his goal, before establishing a doctrine or a consolidated theory about freedom and necessity, is an attempt to instigate new reflections, new thought experiences, new paths of meditation on the action of man. (shrink)

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...) misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

En el Canto V del Infierno, uno de los pasajes más universalmente conocidos de la Divina Comedia, Dante sugiere la fuerza corruptora de la literatura, desencadenante del adulterio de Paolo y Francesca. Este esquema en que lo literario se convierte en motivo de perdición, reaparece en casos tan conocidos como el de Don Quijote y otros menos conocidos como el dickensiano Nicodemus Boffin de Nuestro común amigo. Estos escritores dejan traslucir en sus obras sus inquietudes respecto a una influencia que (...) simultáneamente buscan y temen sobre los lectores. Sus «libros dentro de los libros» pueden ser interpretados como una vacuna con la que el escritor quiere proveer al lector de las herramientas para protegerse de los efectos perversos de una literatura recibida en clave romántica. Proponemos, siguiendo especialmente a Renato Poggioli, John Freccero o René Girard, una interpretación antirromántica que subraya la actualidad de la arquitectura moral de la Divina Comedia y su ascendencia sobre varios clásicos de la literatura moderna posterior. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

La cultura occidental, con la que vivimos y entendemos, nació bajo los auspicios de un triple ente: la conjugación de lacultura arábigo-musulmana, la civilización germano-eslava y el mundo clásico-bíblico; todos éstos vendrían a encajar, en principio, los miembros articulados del hombre moderno occidental. En concreto, las lenguas modernas han resultado un vehículo habitual y pertinente de la cultura clásica, en mayor o menor proporción y la someten a su propio arbitrio, creando una nueva dinámica literaria, determinada por razones estilísticas o (...) de prestigio. Por ello, no dejan de ser preocupantes los constantes vaivenes de una sociedad ávida de informaciones y conocimientos, sin ningún rumbo a seguir ni alguna meta humanamente satisfactoria. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

This work is an introduction on Polo's criticism of Saint Anselm's argument, showing that this argument is inefficient with respect to Polo's comprehesion of the intellect and Polo's study of the existence.

Esta investigación trata sobre la Lógica poética formulada por Giambattista Vico en la Ciencia nueva. Se trata de una teoría de la génesis, desarrollo y constitución del λóγος humano, no en cuanto intelecto, sino en cuanto expresión lingüística. Trata pues del origen del lenguaje. Esta investigación se desarrolla en dos partes (sincrónica y diacrónica) de la que aquí presento la primera. En ulteriores investigaciones acometeré la segunda. El trabajo se inicia con un estudio de las fuentes vichianas y su reformulación (...) por parte de nuestro pensador. Seguidamente se analiza el requisito para la formación de cualquier lenguaje natural (es decir, no formal), que para Vico reside en lo que llama una Metafísica poética. El núcleo del trabajo estriba en la comprensión de lo que Vico denomina primera operación de la mente humana. Desde esta teoría del conocimiento cabe acceder al estudio sincrónico de los factores que posibilitan el lenguaje humano. Los divido en tres tipos: biopsicológicos, socio-culturales e internos al mismo lenguaje. (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

Después de que Friedrich Nietzsche expusiera el fenómeno del resentimiento mediante un supuesto desenmascaramiento de un complejo emotivo oculto, autores posteriores, como Max Scheler y René Girard, matizaron el análisis nietzscheano aplicándolo a diversos ámbitos antropológicos y sociales. Muchas de las principales aportaciones de estos análisis contemporáneos encuentran sus precedentes en autores anteriores, modernos y medievales. Seis siglos y medio antes de Scheler, Tomás de Aquino ofrece en dos cuestiones de su Summa Theologiae dedicadas a la acedia y la envidia (...) una serie de precisiones conceptuales y observaciones psicológicas que coinciden en gran parte de su fondo y, en ocasiones, en la forma, con ciertas caracterizaciones del resentimiento. Demostramos, apoyándonos en numerosas referencias textuales, los paralelismos entre la fenomenología scheleriana del resentimiento y la exposición tomasiana de los vicios capitales. (shrink)

Postmodernity has brought new forms of social control which are exercised through new forms of communication. Paradoxically, however, postmodernity also seemed to be heading towards the exaltation of the individual in their absolute freedom. The 20 th century pushed, in the name of science and progress, the secularization of Western societies, often distancing people from their traditional community ties, including ties to the ecclesial community. Thus, the postmodern individual initially appeared free of ancestral community pressures. However, subtle new forms of (...) social control have replaced traditional ones. Mechanisms such as social media, new forms of work and sexual exploitation, or the impossibility of maintaining privacy in the face of the power of private and public corporations, thus expose the individual to the asocial elements. Frequently, these new social control mechanisms (a clear example being the leadership of the WHO in the policies implemented worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic) are presented to us not as repressive, but scientifically and paternally protective. In this context, the vindication of religious freedom and the community experience of faith represent decisive touchstones for the vitality and validity of a social and political order in which the personal being is truly the highest value. The authors of this monograph are professors, some of them with twenty or thirty years of university teaching, others halfway between Generation X and Y, but all with a deep vocation as teachers called to understanding the world around them. A vocation to collaborate with their students so that the seed of love for the knowledge of reality and the joyful experience of contact with the truth may bear fruit in them. Such an experience only makes sense as a shared experience. And this is what the authors of this monograph usually do: share their concerns, worries, and research. In formal terms, this shared experience has been developing in recent times under the mantle of research projects such as the one that forms the basis of this issue of _Scientia et Fides_: “Social Control, Postmodernism and Political Community” (COSOPOC). Sharing the results of their research is also a way of inviting the specialized public to this experience without forgetting that the first circle of this community work is formed by the students themselves, whom this monograph aims to serve as a stimulus in their personal trajectories as students, as future professionals and, above all, as people in charge of their actions and responsible and capable of facing the worrying challenges that face us all. (from the Editorial). (shrink)

In Postsocial History: An Introduction, historian Miguel A. Cabrera points to the crisis of modernity as a locus for the collapse of social historical models. Previously established theories of social change and social relations are proving insufficient, calling for the emergence of a new social historical theory. By arguing convincingly for the inclusion of language in that model, Cabrera awakens a revolutionary new approach to historiography. The book will prove indispensable to historians, and to social scientists in general, who (...) are dissatisfied with the old paradigms and seek new ways of addressing the challenges of social research. (shrink)